This query asks which scenario is more plausible under the premise of the Simulation Hypothesis (SH): that there is only one conscious entity (you, with others as NPCs) or that there are many conscious entities (many of "us").
Based on the sources, the plausibility hinges entirely on whether one accepts the philosophical premise of Computationalism—the belief that consciousness can emerge purely from complex computation.
If the core assumptions of the Simulation Hypothesis are accepted, it is overwhelmingly more plausible that there are many conscious entities (Scenario B), as the simulation's purpose is generally assumed to be the replication of ancestral experience. However, the sources also articulate the philosophical position (Scenario A) which argues that all simulated beings lack true consciousness, regardless of how real they seem.
1. The Plausibility of Many Conscious Entities (Scenario B)
The Simulation Argument, as proposed by Nick Bostrom, strongly favors the existence of many conscious entities because its entire framework depends on the assumption that simulated minds possess consciousness equivalent to human minds.
Computational and Emergent Consciousness:
- The Fundamental Assumption: The SH argument rests on the premise that "simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct)". This widely accepted position is computationalism, which argues that cognition is a form of computation that is platform independent.
- Simulated Ancestors: If a posthuman civilization runs ancestor simulations, they would generate so many simulated beings ("Sims") that the total number would greatly exceed the total number of actual ancestors. If these Sims are conscious, then the vast majority of minds like ours belong to the simulated rather than the original race.
- Consciousness as an Inevitable Pattern: Consciousness is viewed not as a mystical substance but as a Strange Loop or a sophisticated, highly organized abstract pattern that arises in complex systems. In brains that reach a sufficient level of complexity and category repertoire (the threshold of representational universality), consciousness is an automatic emergent consequence. If the simulation is "high-fidelity", it must necessarily implement the complexity required to generate consciousness for all simulated inhabitants.
- Shared and Distributed Selfhood: The idea of a unique, indivisible "I" is considered a myth. Since the self is fundamentally a pattern, and the human brain is a representationally universal "machine" that mirrors other people, identity is transportable and shareable. If the simulation faithfully copies the complex pattern that constitutes consciousness across millions of simulated brains, those patterns (souls/I's) are duplicated and exist.
Therefore, given the inherent logic of the Simulation Hypothesis, if consciousness is computable, the conclusion is that many of us exist (Proposition 3 of Bostrom's trilemma: "The fraction of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one").
2. The Plausibility of Only One Conscience and Many NPCs (Scenario A)
The possibility that you are the only conscious entity while everyone else is an NPC (a philosophical zombie) is viable only if the central premise of computationalism is rejected, or if the simulation is deliberately engineered for solipsism.
The Philosophical Zombie Challenge
- Consciousness Requires "Extra Stuff": Critics of computationalism, like John Searle, insist that programs alone are insufficient for minds because they lack intrinsic intentionality (genuine meaning). Simulation, by definition, is a formal program. Searle's view requires conscious intentionality and ontological subjectivity—the idea that the mind consists of subjective conscious experiences ("qualia") "right down to the ground".
- Simulated Behavior vs. Actual Feeling: It is possible for simulated people to behave appropriately, yet be philosophical zombies that are merely simulating consciousness. The Chinese Room argument supports this, demonstrating that computational processes and their output (e.g., passing behavioral tests like the Turing Test) can exist without the corresponding cognitive state. If the underlying hardware (biological substrate, squirts of chemicals) matters more than the abstract pattern, then simulated beings may be feelingless, hollow zombies, regardless of how convincing they are.
- Simulation Efficiency: If the Simulators were purely pragmatic, they might only compute true consciousness for the specific entity they are observing or interacting with (the "I"), while rendering all other billions of characters (the NPCs) with just enough complexity to act naturally without expending the computational resources required for true self-awareness.
The Subjective Illusion of Unique Identity
- The Inescapable "I": Regardless of whether NPCs exist, every conscious entity experiences an undeniable sense of being the only one here. The "I" is the most solid rock of undeniability of all. This "I" is a self-reinforcing structure and tremendously effective illusion that is shielded from the lower, physical levels of the brain.
- The Madness of Parallel Worlds: This subjective singularity is strong enough that if the world appears contradictory, the observer (like Aomame in a parallel world) questions their own sanity rather than questioning the certainty of their internal self-perception.
- The Solipsistic Desire: The deeply ingrained human convention, the caged-bird metaphor, insists that "One body, one soul". This intuition makes the possibility of being an isolated soul surrounded by automatons ("I am but a figment inside of someone else's mentality!") compelling, even if the non-dualistic view argues against it.
Conclusion
The sources present a rigorous philosophical conflict, suggesting that the most plausible outcome under the Simulation Hypothesis is tied to one's commitment to the physics of consciousness.
- Based on the premise of the Simulation Hypothesis (Computationalism): The hypothesis itself presupposes that consciousness is computable, which means that the simulated people, if built to a high-fidelity standard, would possess consciousness. Therefore, Scenario B (There are many of us) is the default and statistically expected outcome.
- Based on the Skeptical/Dualistic View: If consciousness requires a specialized, non-computable element (élan mental), or if simulation inherently fails to produce intrinsic intentionality, then the simulated world could be full of philosophical zombies. In this case, Scenario A (I'm the only one) becomes plausible, meaning the simulator only "turned on the light" in your simulated brain.
Ultimately, the question "What makes one of those strange loops me?" has no simple answer, and the philosophical choice—whether the simulated pattern is consciousness, or merely a convincing imitation—remains the crux of the matter.